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## Research Note

# Reliability and validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys on party positioning

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**Abstract.** This research note reports on the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys (CHES), which measure national party positioning on European integration, ideology, and several European Union (EU) and non-EU policies. The reliability of expert judgments is examined and the CHES data are cross-validated with data from the Comparative Manifesto Project, the 2003 Benoit-Laver expert survey and the 2002 Rohrschneider-Whitefield survey. The dataset is available on the CHES website.

This research note reports on the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys (CHES) of the policy and ideological stances of national political parties in Europe.[1] These surveys continue a time series that goes back to 1984. They reveal, for example, that the weighted average (by vote) of party support for European integration in the EU-12 was 5.4 (on a seven point scale) in 1984, peaked at 5.8 in 1992 and fell to 5.2 in 2006.[2] In 1984, opposition was primarily on the economic left; by 2006, opposition became two-sided with the rise of the populist right. Christian democrats and liberals remain the strongest supporters, but they have been joined – and in several countries overtaken – by social democrats. Conservative parties have become ambivalent. Green parties have seen the greatest change in position – from mildly Eurosceptic in the 1980s to mildly supportive in 2006. European integration has become considerably more salient and more divisive, though there are conjunctural swings and variation across party families and territory.[3]

A second focus of the CHES data is to monitor ideological positioning of political parties on a general left/right dimension and, since 1999, on the economic left/right and socio-cultural gal/tan (or new politics) dimensions. The data enable us to track the changing relationship between general left/right

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ideology and party support for European integration over two decades. In 1984, the association was linear (r = 0.30); by 1992 opposition from both the extreme left and populist right created an inverted U-curve for Western Europe. In the East, by contrast, Euroscepticism is concentrated in a single set of left-tan parties.[4]

## The Chapel Hill expert surveys

The 2002 and 2006 surveys extend the Ray dataset for 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 (Ray 1999) and the Chapel Hill survey of 1999 (Steenbergen & Marks 2007).[5] The 2002 survey was conducted in spring 2003 and covers 171 national parties in 23 countries. The 2006 survey was conducted in the summer of 2007 and covers 227 national political parties in 29 countries.

The 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys:

- replicate questions from the Ray and the 1999 Chapel Hill datasets on European integration, issue salience and internal party dissent;
- replicate questions from the 1999 CHES dataset on five EU policies: cohesion policy, internal market, foreign and security policy, powers of the European parliament and enlargement;[6]
- add, for 2006, questions on party positioning and salience for 13 non-EU policy dimensions surveyed by Benoit & Laver (2006);[7] and
- extend country coverage beyond the 14 larger Western EU members in the Ray and Chapel Hill 1999 datasets to nine post-communist countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) in 2002, plus Estonia and five candidate-EU members (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey) in 2006.

The core of the CHES data consists of six items: general party positioning on European integration; salience of European integration; internal party dissent on European integration; general party positioning on the left/right ideological dimension; party positioning on the economic left/right; and party positioning on the socio-cultural gal/tan.[8] Appendix 1 provides question wordings for these items.

## Reliability

The positions that political parties take on major political issues cannot be observed directly but can be estimated using either behavioural evidence from party manifestos, television debates, roll call votes or parliamentary speeches, or evaluations by voters, parliamentarians or third-party analysts (Benoit & Laver 2006). Expert surveys have some virtues that have led social scientists to use them rather widely, particularly in the study of political parties and public opinion. When the object of inquiry is complex, it makes sense to rely on the evaluations of experts – that is, individuals who can access and process diverse sources of information.

Expert surveys are flexible in two important respects: they do not require that specific sources of information (e.g., roll call votes, opinion surveys of elite position, election manifestos or elite surveys) be accessible in all cases, and they are relatively inexpensive to administer. In addition, expert surveys allow the researcher to use a single format to ask a common set of questions. Whereas roll call votes, surveys and manifesto tabulations provide data that the researcher interprets after simplifying the data (e.g., using factor analysis or scaling techniques), expert surveys allow the researcher to design dimensions deductively.

> If someone devises a way to measure party policy positions – whether this is based on content analysis, roll call voting patterns, opinion surveys or anything else – the first question that arises has to do with the substantive validity of the measurements being generated. We can assess this informally by looking at the numbers to see if they seem reasonable, and more systematically by comparing these with the output of alternative methods that have set out to measure the same thing for at least some of the cases in which we are interested. When alternative measures of the 'same' thing conflict, we tend to resort to experts – specialists on the politics of the country under investigation – who can use their expert knowledge to adjudicate on the substantive plausibility of what is on offer. There is an obvious danger that proponents of some particular measure will deploy expert opinion selectively and rhetorically, citing experts whose views are sympathetic and ignoring others. The great virtue of an expert survey is that it sets out to summarize the judgments of the *consensus* of experts on the matters at issue, and moreover to do so in a *systematic* way (Benoit & Laver 2006: 9; emphases in original).

However, there are potential pitfalls relating to the selection of experts and the question format (Budge 2006; Marks et al. 2007; Steenbergen & Marks 2007).

With respect to *expert selection*, some studies rely on one or two carefully selected experts, while others use a much larger pool (see Tables 1a and 1b). While it is generally better to have a larger pool of experts, there are instances where knowledge is limited to a handful of observers or participants, either because only a few persons are privy to the relevant information (e.g., government positions in behind-closed-doors negotiations) or because only a few

Table 1a. Experts and political parties in the 2002 survey

| | Surveys sent | Surveys returned | Response rate (%) | Number of parties | | Surveys sent | Surveys returned | Response rate (%) | Number of parties |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 18 | 8 | 44.4 | 5 | Bulgaria | 32 | 11 | 34.4 | 6 |
| Belgium | 30 | 11 | 36.7 | 10 | Czech Republic | 48 | 18 | 37.5 | 5 |
| Denmark | 24 | 13 | 54.2 | 6 | Estonia | 12 | 0 | 0.0 | 7 |
| Finland | 17 | 9 | 52.9 | 7 | Hungary | 31 | 14 | 45.2 | 6 |
| France | 34 | 13 | 38.2 | 8 | Latvia | 9 | 4 | 44.4 | 8 |
| Germany | 36 | 14 | 38.9 | 6 | Lithuania | 15 | 5 | 33.3 | 14 |
| Greece | 19 | 11 | 57.9 | 4 | Poland | 34 | 8 | 23.6 | 9 |
| Ireland | 18 | 8 | 44.4 | 6 | Romania | 44 | 11 | 25.0 | 7 |
| Italy | 28 | 14 | 50.0 | 12 | Slovakia | 32 | 14 | 43.8 | 10 |
| Netherlands | 27 | 9 | 33.3 | 9 | Slovenia | 19 | 5 | 26.3 | 8 |
| Portugal | 17 | 7 | 41.2 | 4 | | | | | |
| Spain | 24 | 12 | 50.0 | 9 | | | | | |
| Sweden | 27 | 13 | 48.1 | 7 | | | | | |
| United Kingdom | 34 | 18 | 52.9 | 5 | | | | | |
| EU-West total | 353 | 160 | | 98 | EU-East total | 276 | 90 | | 73 |
| EU-West mean | 25.2 | 11.4 | 45.2 | 7.0 | EU-East mean* | 29.3 | 10 | 34.1 | 8.1 |

Note: * Estonia is not included in the mean calculations.

*Table 1b.* Experts and political parties in the 2006 survey

| | Surveys sent | Surveys returned | Response rates (%) | Number of parties | | Surveys sent | Surveys returned | Response rates (%) | Number of parties |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 20 | 8 | 40.0 | 7 | Bulgaria | 31 | 14 | 45.0 | 7 |
| Belgium-Flemish | 16 | 10 | 62.5 | 6 | Czech Republic | 22 | 9 | 40.9 | 7 |
| Belgium-French | 21 | 7 | 33.3 | 4 | Estonia | 16 | 6 | 37.5 | 6 |
| Denmark | 20 | 9 | 45.0 | 9 | Hungary | 36 | 6 | 16.7 | 5 |
| Finland | 21 | 12 | 57.1 | 8 | Latvia | 8 | 4 | 50.0 | 9 |
| France | 25 | 9 | 36.0 | 8 | Lithuania | 19 | 8 | 42.1 | 8 |
| Germany | 14 | 11 | 78.6 | 6 | Poland | 24 | 8 | 33.3 | 8 |
| Greece | 22 | 10 | 45.4 | 6 | Romania | 21 | 10 | 47.6 | 7 |
| Ireland | 16 | 10 | 62.5 | 6 | Slovakia | 33 | 14 | 42.4 | 8 |
| Italy | 18 | 8 | 44.4 | 17 | Slovenia | 25 | 5 | 20.0 | 8 |
| Netherlands | 21 | 12 | 57.1 | 8 | | | | | |
| Portugal | 19 | 10 | 52.6 | 5 | | | | | |
| Spain | 26 | 13 | 50.0 | 10 | | | | | |
| Sweden | 16 | 11 | 68.8 | 8 | | | | | |
| United Kingdom | 18 | 10 | 55.6 | 7 | | | | | |
| EU-West total | 293 | 150 | | 115 | EU-East total | 235 | 84 | | 73 |
| EU-West mean | 19.5 | 10.0 | 51.3 | 7.7 | EU-East mean | 23.5 | 8.4 | 35.7 | 7.3 |

persons have the relevant expertise (Dorussen et al. 2005). Gauging the positioning of political parties demands specialised, but not confidential, knowledge. Political parties are in the business of conveying their positions to mass publics. The challenge for an expert is to interpret and synthesise signals from diverse sources: speeches; manifestos; roll call votes; and information reported in newspapers, television and the Internet. One can usually identify at least a dozen professional researchers who have published on political parties and/or European integration in a particular country.[9] In 2002, 629 experts were contacted and 39.7 per cent responded. In 2006, 632 experts were contacted with a response rate of 42.9 per cent. Only Estonia in 2002 did not meet the threshold of four or more completed questionnaires for inclusion in the dataset.

Respondents were invited to skip questions or parties that were unfamiliar to them. The questionnaire included the following statement: 'We would like you to answer all questions. However, please feel free to skip questions you cannot answer, and to skip parties that are unfamiliar to you. We would rather that you return an incomplete questionnaire than no questionnaire at all.' Our intention is to diminish the variance of expert judgments on items demanding specialised knowledge. An average of 9.9 experts answered the six core questions in 2002, and an average of 8.3 experts answered more specific EU policy questions; in 2006, the averages were 8.3 for the core six and 7.2 for EU policy.

With respect to *question wording*, we seek to minimise ambiguity by specifying the actor whose position is evaluated (i.e., the party leadership), the time frame of the evaluation and the precise content of the political issue in question, including the substantive meaning of the extreme values and often of intermediate values.[10] The questionnaires are available on the CHES website.

Unambiguous question wording is necessary but not sufficient for reliable expert judgments. Perhaps the most important source of error lies neither in poor question-wording, nor in the selection of experts, but in asking questions that lie beyond the expertise of respondents. The 2002 Chapel Hill survey included an item that required experts to evaluate on which of eight particular European issues political parties were internally divided. The lack of reliable responses induced us to drop this line of questioning for 2006. It is worth emphasising that simplicity and economy of the expert survey is a lure as well as an opportunity. Expert surveys are appropriate only for that subset of topics where reliable information is not available in documentary sources, but can be found in the brains of experts.

## *Estimating reliability*

Estimates of party positions are means of expert evaluations. To what extent are these means reliable summaries? One way to account for the possibility of outlying survey responses is to estimate robust means by regressing a continuous variable on dummy variables for groups of interest (Andersen 2008). Regressing estimates of position, salience and dissent by country on dummy variables for political party, we find that correlations between these estimates and simple party means range from 0.97 to 0.99. Convergence of alternative estimates of group means suggests that they are reliable even in the presence of outlying responses.

Table 2 summarises standard deviations of expert scores. Large standard deviations indicate that experts are 'judging different objects, on different dimensions, at different points in time' (Steenbergen & Marks 2007: 351) or, as noted above, are judging objects for which they have sparse information. However, the standard deviations reported here are quite small. As one might expect, experts are most in agreement on the positioning of parties on basic dimensions of competition: left/right; economic left/right; gal/tan; general position on European integration; and positions on non-EU policy dimensions. They are least in agreement on items that measure more abstract phenomena: salience of European integration; internal party dissent on European integration; EU policies; and salience of non-EU policy dimensions. Expert evaluations for political parties in Western Europe tend to be more reliable than for political parties in post-communist Europe, though the difference is slight. Variation in reliability does not cluster significantly by country.[11]

One can probe error by regressing the standard deviations of expert scores on factors that might lead to divergence among experts. The estimates for the six core items in Table 3 suggest that familiarity breeds reliability. Experts evaluate large parties (*party vote*), salient issues (*issue salience*), extreme parties (*party extremism*) and Western parties (*West*) most reliably.[12] *Party dissent* not only blurs a party in the minds of voters, but makes it more difficult for experts to identify a party's stance.

Reliability pertains to random error in the context of repeated measurement, and the errors detected here are reasonably small, structured and intelligible. The fact that error occurs in predictable fashion is useful information for those who wish to combine datasets to exploit their relative strengths.

## Validity

Are the data valid? Do the measures accurately capture what we have in mind – party positioning on European integration? Are the experts we use appropriate witnesses to the phenomenon we seek to capture? These are difficult questions and, from a philosophical viewpoint, one can never be certain about the validity of a measure (Goertz 2005; Herrera & Kapur 2007; Munck &

*Table 2.* Average standard deviations among experts in 2002 and 2006

| | Position on European integration | Salience of European integration | Dissent on European integration | General left/right | Economic left/right | New politics gal/tan | Position on EU policies | Position on policy dimensions | Salience on policy dimensions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| West | | | | | | | | | |
| 2002 (N = 98) | 0.13 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.18 | | |
| 2006 (N = 114) | 0.14 | 0.23 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.20 |
| East | | | | | | | | | |
| 2002 (N = 73) | 0.14 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.18 | | |
| 2006 (N = 73) | 0.14 | 0.23 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.20 |
| All | | | | | | | | | |
| 2002 (N = 171) | 0.14 | 0.21 | 0.20 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.18 | | |
| 2006 (N = 187) | 0.14 | 0.23 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.20 |

Notes: Scores rescaled 0–1. Scores for the positions on EU policies represent the average standard deviations among experts by party for all EU policy questions (nine policies in 2002 and five policies in 2006). Scores for the positions on policy dimensions and salience of policy dimensions represent the average standard deviations among experts by party for all 13 policy dimensions included in the 2006 survey. See Appendix 1 for question wording on the six core items, and the website for all other question wordings.

*Table 3.* Predicting standard deviations in expert judgment

| | European integration | European integration | Salience of European integration | Dissent on European integration | General left/right | Economic left/right | New politics gal/tan |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | 0.138 (0.003)*** | 0.138 (0.003)*** | 0.214 (0.004)*** | 0.182 (0.003)*** | 0.104 (0.003)*** | 0.126 (0.003)*** | 0.144 (0.003)*** |
| Party vote | –0.007 (0.003)** | –0.013 (0.004)*** | –0.005 (0.044) | –0.005 (0.003) | –0.012 (0.003)*** | –0.008 (0.003)** | –0.011 (0.003)*** |
| Number of parties | –0.004 (0.003) | –0.005 (0.004) | 0.006 (0.004) | 0.009 (0.003)* | 0.001 (0.003) | 0.008 (0.003)** | 0.002 (0.003) |
| Number of experts | –0.001 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.004) | 0.007 (0.004) | –0.008 (0.004)* | –0.002 (0.003) | –0.003 (0.003) | –0.001 (0.003) |
| Party extremism | –0.051 (0.003)*** | | –0.047 (0.004)*** | –0.043 (0.003)*** | –0.008 (0.003)** | –0.020 (0.004)*** | –0.029 (0.003)*** |
| West | –0.004 (0.003)* | –0.008 (0.003)* | –0.003 (0.004) | –0.010 (0.003)** | –0.015 (0.003)*** | –0.015 (0.003)*** | –0.007 (0.003)* |
| 2006 Survey | 0.001 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.004) | 0.001 (0.004) | –0.019 (0.003) | –0.003 (0.003) | –0.007 (0.003)* | –0.003 (0.003) |
| Issue salience | | –0.027 (0.004)*** | | | | | |
| Internal party dissent | | 0.015 (0.004)*** | | | | | |
| Multiple regression (Adj. $R^2$) | 0.56 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 0.45 | 0.11 | 0.25 | 0.23 |

Notes: N = 358. * Significant at 0.05 level. ** Significant at 0.01 level. *** Significant at 0.001 level. Dependent variables are standard deviations among experts; rescaled 0–1. Independent variables are Z-scores.

Verkuilen 2002). A serious concern for an expert survey is that it may be registering a biased professional consensus.[13]

Comparing estimates derived from different measures allows one to probe the existence and sources of bias (Benoit & Laver 2006; Gabel & Huber 2000; Marks 2007; McDonald et al. 2007).[14] The validity of expert survey data on party positioning has been explored in comparison with data from party manifestos, public opinion and surveys of MPs and MEPs. This literature reveals that evaluations of party positioning provided by academic experts and by political actors, particularly MPs and MEPs, are highly correlated (Netjes & Binnema 2007), that evaluations produced by separately conducted expert surveys are convergent (Whitefield et al. 2007), and that expert surveys are more consistent with the evaluations of voters and parliamentarians than data currently available from party manifestos (Marks et al. 2007). A detailed examination of the reliability and validity of the 1999 Chapel Hill dataset is consistent with these findings (Steenbergen & Marks 2007).

Comparable data are available only for 2002. For West European parties, one can compare the CHES dataset with the 2003 Benoit-Laver expert survey and the Comparative Manifesto Research Group (CMP) dataset.

> Chapel Hill expert survey Q1: 'How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party's leadership has taken over the course of 2002? For each party, please circle the number that corresponds best to your view,' scaled from 1 (strongly opposed to European integration) to 7 (strongly in favour of European integration).
>
> The 2003 Benoit-Laver expert survey Q24 – EU: Authority, scaled from 1 (favours increasing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy) to 20 (favours reducing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy).[15]
>
> The CMP dataset codes the proportion of an electoral manifesto that is devoted to favourable quasi-sentences referring to European integration and the proportion devoted to unfavourable quasi-sentences for national elections held in 2002 or for the national election prior (Budge et al. 2001).[16] We derive two measures: *manifesto ratio*, the ratio of positive EU mentions to the sum of positive and negative EU mentions; and *manifesto difference*, positive minus negative mentions.

Confirmatory factor analysis for 72 political parties common to the CHES, CMP and Benoit-Laver datasets (Table 4, column 1) reveals that a single factor explains almost three-quarters of the variance of positioning on European integration. The standardised loading of the expert survey is 0.99, equivalent to a true score reliability of 0.97.

*Table 4.* Cross-validating different measures of party positioning on European integration

| | West | East |
|---|---|---|
| Chapel Hill (position) | 0.987 | 0.999 |
| Manifesto ratio (positive/total) | 0.600 | 0.556 |
| Manifesto difference (positive – negative) | 0.652 | 0.575 |
| Benoit-Laver (authority) | 0.915 | |
| Rohrschneider-Whitefield (political integration) | | 0.945 |
| Chi$^2$ | 25.68* | 21.79* |
| Eigenvalue | 2.97 | 2.92 |
| Explained variance | 74.3 | 72.9 |

Notes: Factor analysis using maximum likelihood. N = 72 (listwise deletion) for the West; N = 48 (listwise deletion) for the East; unweighted by vote. The 2002 Chapel Hill survey data are paired with the comparative manifesto data (1999–2003), Benoit-Laver (2003) and Rohrschneider-Whitefield (2002). The scale for the Benoit-Laver item is reversed. * df = 2, $p < 0.000$.

Both the Chapel Hill and Benoit-Laver expert surveys ask experts to evaluate party positioning on the European Parliament.

> Chapel Hill expert survey Q4: 'Take the position of the party leadership on the powers of the European Parliament. Some parties want more powers for the European Parliament. Other parties are opposed to expanding further the powers of the European Parliament. Where does the leadership of the following parties stand?', scaled from 1 (strongly opposes expanding EU powers) to 7 (strongly favours expanding EU powers).
>
> Benoit-Laver expert survey Q23: EU accountability, scaled from 1 (promotes the direct accountability of the EU to citizens via institutions such as the European Parliament) to 20 (promotes the indirect accountability of the EU to citizens via their own national governments).

The correlation between expert evaluations for the 72 political parties common to these datasets is 0.87. On this question, 75.5 per cent of the variance is shared.

How about post-communist Europe? The CMP dataset and the 2002 Rohrschneider-Whitefield expert survey are available for cross-validation on the general stance of political parties on European integration.[17] The CMP and CHES data are as described above for Western Europe, and the corresponding Rohrschneider/Whitefield question is as follows:

> Rohrschneider/Whitefield Q6: integration with the West: 'How about the EU? Regardless of the specific form that integration may take, where do parties stand on creating a politically unified Europe?' scaled from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly support).

Confirmatory factor analysis reveals that one factor accounts for slightly more than 70 per cent of the variance and that the true score reliability of the Chapel Hill data for post-communist political parties is 0.99 (Table 4).

Both the Chapel Hill and Benoit-Laver surveys have questions on party positioning on enlargement.

> Chapel Hill survey Q11: 'Consider EU membership for [COUNTRY]. Some parties strongly support major domestic reforms to qualify for EU membership as soon as possible. Other parties oppose this. Where does the party leadership of the following parties stand?', scaled from 1 (strongly opposes major domestic reforms to qualify for EU membership) to 7 (strongly favours major domestic reforms to qualify for EU membership).
>
> Benoit-Laver Q4: EU joining, scaled from 1 (opposes joining the EU) to 20 (favours joining the EU).

The association between expert evaluations on this question is 0.87 for 42 common parties, yielding a shared variance of 76 per cent.

These analyses suggest quite high levels of inter-expert reliability and considerable common structure across different measures. The CHES survey produces information that is in line with alternative sources. There is a reasonable level of convergence between the CHES data and the manifesto coding data, a non-expert instrument, though the associations are lower than with expert surveys. This is consistent with prior research that has shown that manifesto data and expert surveys tend to have different biases: manifesto data are less valid for parties with short manifestos or parties with internal dissent, while expert surveys are less valid at capturing positioning for parties on which experts disagree (Marks et al. 2006).

Convergence among the datasets cannot rule out the possibility that all suffer from bias, but bias would have to be shared to produce the common structure we detect. This is logically possible, but implausible. Comparing lists of experts in the Rohrschneider/Whitefield survey with those used in the Chapel Hill survey reveals few common names. Residuals across the datasets used in the analyses above are weakly correlated with each other (0.3 or less). There is little evidence that collective professional delusion might have led experts to misjudge consistently and similarly some parties or party families on European integration. Expert disagreement – not collusion – appears to be the greatest source of error.

## Conclusion

The two most recent waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey examine national party positioning on European integration in 23 (2002) and 29 (2006) countries in the EU and its neighbourhood. We examine the reliability of expert judgments and compare their validity with the Comparative Manifesto data and the Benoit-Laver and Rohrschneider-Whitefield expert surveys. Consistent with previous studies, the analysis suggests that the CHES data are a reasonably valid and reliable source of information on party positioning on European integration and ideological positioning. Reliability is rarely uniform across a dataset. Here it varies by question, country and party. On our website, we provide individual expert responses by political party. Data collection is an imperfect enterprise; the purpose of validation is to detect and explain error.

## Appendix 1. Question wording for the six core items in the 2002 and 2006 surveys

| Item | 2002 survey | 2006 survey | Range |
|---|---|---|---|
| Position on European integration | Q1: How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party's leadership has taken over the course of 2002? For each party row, please circle the number that corresponds best to your view. Circle only one number: | Q1: How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party leadership took over the course of 2006? | 1–7 |
| | 1 = strongly opposed to European integration | 1 = strongly opposed | |
| | 2 = opposed to European integration | 2 = opposed | |
| | 3 = somewhat opposed to European integration | 3 = somewhat opposed | |
| | 4 = neutral to European integration | 4 = neutral | |
| | 5 = somewhat in favour of European integration | 5 = somewhat in favour | |
| | 6 = in favour of European integration | 6 = in favour | |
| | 7 = strongly in favour of European integration | 7 = strongly in favour | |
| Salience of European integration | Q2: We would like you to think about the salience of European integration. Over the course of 2002, how important has the EU been to the parties in their public stance? | Q2: We would like you to think about the salience of European integration for a party. Over the course of 2006, how important was the EU to the parties in their public stance? | 1–4 |
| | 1 = European integration is of no importance at all | 1 = no importance | |
| | 2 = European integration is of little importance | 2 = little importance | |
| | 3 = European integration is of some importance | 3 = some importance | |
| | 4 = European integration is of great importance | 4 = great importance | |

## **Appendix 1.** Continued.

| Item | 2002 survey | 2006 survey | Range |
|---|---|---|---|
| Internal dissent on European integration | Q11: How much internal dissent has there been in the various parties in [country] over European integration over the course of 2002? If you believe that a party is completely united on European integration, please circle 1. If you believe it is extremely divided, please circle 10. Intermediate numbers reflect the scale and intensity of disagreement inside the party. | Q3: What about conflict or dissent within parties over European integration over the course of 2006?<br>0 = party was completely united<br>. . .<br>10 = party was completely divided | 1–10 (2002)<br>0–10 (2006) |
| General left/right | Q13: We would like you to classify the parties in terms of their broad ideology. On the scale below, 0 indicates that a party is at the extreme left of the ideological spectrum, 10 indicates that it is at the extreme right and 5 means that it is at the centre. For each party, please circle the ideological position that best describes the party's overall ideology.<br>0 = extreme left . . .<br>5 = centre . . .<br>10 = extreme right | Q10: Please tick the box that best describes each party's overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).<br>0 = extreme left . . .<br>5 = centre . . .<br>10 = extreme right | 0–10 |
| Economic left/right | Q14: Political scientists often classify parties in terms of their ideological stance on economic issues. Parties to the right emphasise a reduced economic role for government. They want privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, reduced government spending and a leaner welfare state. Parties to the left want government to play an active role in the economy. Using these criteria, indicate where parties are located in terms of their economic ideology.<br>0 = extreme left. . .<br>5 = centre. . .<br>10 = extreme right | Q11: Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasise a reduced economic role for government: privatisation, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending and a leaner welfare state.<br>0 = extreme left . . .<br>5 = centre . . .<br>10 = extreme right | 0–10 |
| New politics/galtan | Q15: Parties may also be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. 'Libertarian' or 'postmaterialist' parties favour expanded personal freedoms – for example, access to abortion, doctor-assisted suicide, same-sex marriages or greater democratic participation. 'Traditional' or 'authoritarian' parties often reject these ideas; they value order and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority. Where are parties located in terms of their ideological views on freedoms and rights?<br>0 = libertarian/postmaterialist . . .<br>5 = centre . . .<br>10 = traditional/authoritarian | Q12: Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. 'Libertarian' or 'postmaterialist' parties favour expanded personal freedoms – for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage or greater democratic participation. 'Traditional' or 'authoritarian' parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.<br>0 = libertarian/postmaterialist . . .<br>5 = centre . . .<br>10 = traditional/authoritarian | 0–10 |

## Notes

1. The CHES datasets for 2002, 2006 and 1999–2006 are available online at: www.unc.edu/~hooghe. These surveys were funded by the European Union Center at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
2. Included are political parties that obtain at least 2% of the vote in the election immediately prior to the survey year or that elect at least one representative to the national parliament. A total of 53 parties met this criterion in 1984, 54 in 1992 and 62 in 2006.
3. See, e.g., De Vries and Edwards (2009); Edwards (2009); Manow et al. (2008); Marks & Wilson (2000).
4. Hooghe et al. (2002) theorise how these ideological dimensions structure party positioning on European integration. Marks et al. (2006) explain the structuring of party positioning in East and West. Vachudova and Hooghe (2009) examine party competition in the new Member States.
5. The 2002 survey was sent out by mail and E-mail; the 2006 survey was conducted on the Web.
6. The 2002 survey includes questions on four additional EU policies: employment, agriculture, environment and asylum.
7. These policy dimensions are improving public services versus reducing taxes, deregulation of markets, redistribution from the rich to the poor, civil liberties versus law and order, lifestyle (e.g., homosexuality), role of religious principles in politics, immigration policy, integration of immigrants and asylum seekers, urban versus rural interests, cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, political decentralisation to regions/localities, American leadership in world affairs, rights for ethnic minorities. Rovny and Edwards (2008) analyse policy dimensions using CHES data.
8. 'Gal/tan' refers to values ranging from GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) to TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) (Hooghe et al. 2002). This dimension extends 'new politics' (Franklin 1992) and left/libertarian versus right/authoritarian politics (Kitschelt 1994).
9. Excluding graduate students, party officials and journalists.
10. The general question on European integration reads: 'How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party leadership took over the course of 2006?', on a seven-point scale ranging 1 (strongly opposed), 2 (opposed), 3 (somewhat opposed), 4 (neutral), 5 (somewhat in favour), 6 (in favour) and 7 (strongly in favour). The section on 13 policy dimensions begins: 'Finally, some questions on where political parties stood on the following policy dimensions in Austria in 2006. On each dimension, we ask you to assess the position of the party leadership, and then to assess the importance/salience of this dimension for a party's public stance. . . . 13. Position on improving public services vs. reducing taxes.' Followed by an 11-point scale with extreme positions defined as follows: '0 = strongly favours improving public services; 10 = strongly favours reducing taxes.'
11. The countries with the highest average standard deviations are: for position, Slovenia in 2006 (0.22); for salience, Belgium in 2002 (0.30), Ireland in 2006 (0.30) and Lithuania in 2006 (0.30); for dissent, Latvia in 2002 (0.35); for general left/right, Bulgaria in 2006 (0.16) and Romania in 2006 (0.16); for economic left/right, Slovakia in 2002 (0.18) and Austria in 2006 (0.18); for gal/tan, Latvia in 2006 (0.21); for all EU policies pooled, Ireland in 2002 (0.25) and Romania in 2006 (0.21); for all policy dimensions pooled,

Latvia in 2006 (0.21). (The policy dimension questions were only asked in the 2006 survey.) Country-specific results are available from the authors upon request.

12. This is consistent with Benoit and Laver's finding that standard deviations among experts for post-communist countries are larger (Benoit & Laver 2006: 224).
13. Collective expert bias could result if the professional consensus is wrong, if experts coordinate evaluations or if the ideological leanings of academic experts affect their evaluations. Benoit and Laver examine whether experts' political sympathies affect party placements on left-right for 387 parties in 47 countries. For seven parties only (all populist right or conservative-national parties) politically unsympathetic experts were significantly more likely to give the party a more extreme score than neutral or sympathetic experts (Benoit & Laver 2006: 136–138).
14. In psychometric research this type of analysis is called 'criterion validity'. Adcock and Collier (2001; see also Carmines and Zeller 1979) label this 'convergent validity'. Given that the indicators used in the factor analyses reported here are measured ordinally, it is possible that conventional factor analytic techniques are inappropriate. Factor analysis assumes that observed indicators of the latent construct are measured at the interval level and it models the relationship among indicators with linear correlations. When we relax the assumption of linearity and estimate polychoric correlations, this produces almost identical results.
15. The dataset can be downloaded from: www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/ppmd/.
16. We thank Andrea Volkens for providing the most recent data for this analysis.
17. With thanks to Robert Rohrschneider, who provided the Whitefield-Rohrschneider dataset. The Benoit-Laver expert survey did not field a comparable question.

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